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Abstract
To increase trust in artificial intelligence systems, a growing amount of works are
enhancing these systems with the capability of producing natural language expla-
nations that support their predictions. In this work, we show that such appealing
frameworks are nonetheless prone to generating inconsistent explanations, such
as “A dog is an animal” and “A dog is not an animal”, which are likely to decrease
users’ trust in these systems. To detect such inconsistencies, we introduce a sim-
ple but effective adversarial framework for generating a complete target sequence,
a scenario that has not been addressed so far. Finally, we apply our framework
to a state-of-the-art neural model that provides natural language explanations on
SNLI, and we show that this model is capable of generating a significant amount
of inconsistencies.
1 Introduction
For machine learning systems to be widely adopted in practice, they need to be trusted by users [10].
However, the black-box nature of neural networks can create doubt or lack of trust, especially since
recent works show that highly accurate models can heavily rely on annotation artifacts [13, 6]. In
order to increase users’ trust in these systems, a growing number of works [4, 26, 19, 14, 21] enhance
neural networks with an explanation generation module that is jointly trained to produce natural
language explanations for their final decisions. The supervision on the explanations usually comes
from human-provided explanations for the ground-truth answers.
In this work, we first draw attention to the fact that the explanationmodule may generate inconsistent
explanations. For example, a system that generates “Snow implies outdoors” for justifying one
prediction, and “Snow implies indoors” for justifying another predictionwould likely decrease users’
trust in the system. We note that, while users may already decrease their trust in a model that
generates incorrect statements, such as “Snow implies indoors”, if these statements are consistent
over the input space, the users might, at least, be reassured that the explanations are a good reflection
of the inner workings of the model. Subsequently, they may not trust the model when it is applied on
certain concepts, such as the snow’s location, but they may trust the model on other concepts where
it has shown a persistently correct understanding.
Generating Adversarial Explanations. Adversarial examples [29] are inputs that have been
specifically designed by an adversary to cause a machine learning algorithm to produce an incorrect
answer [2]. In this work, we focus on the problem of generating adversarial explanations. More
specifically, given a machine learning model that can jointly produce predictions and their explana-
tions, we propose a framework that can identify inputs that cause the model to generate mutually
inconsistent explanations.
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To this date, most of the research on adversarial examples in computer vision focuses on generating
adversarial perturbations that are imperceptible to humans, but make the machine learning model to
produce a different prediction [12]. Similarly, in natural language processing, most of the literature
focuses on identifying semantically invariant modifications of natural language sentences that cause
neural models to change their predictions [32].
Our problem has three desired properties that make it different from commonly researched adversar-
ial setups:
1. The model has to generate a complete target sequence, i.e., the attack is considered suc-
cessful if the model generates an explanation that is inconsistent with a given generated
explanation. This is more challenging than the adversarial setting commonly addressed in
sequence-to-sequence models, where the objective is generating sequences characterized
by the presence or absence of certain given tokens [8, 33].
2. The adversarial input does not have to be a paraphrase or a small perturbation of the original
input, since our objective is generating mutually inconsistent explanations and not a label
attack. 1
3. We strongly prefer the adversarial inputs to be grammatically correct English sentences
— in previous works, this requirement never appears jointly with the aforementioned two
requirements.
To our knowledge, our work is the first to tackle this problem setting, especially due to the com-
plete target requirement, which is a challenging requirement for sequence generation. The simple
yet effective framework that we introduce for the above scenario consists of training a neural net-
work, which we call REVERSEJUSTIFIER, to invert the explanation module, i.e., to find an input for
which the model will produce a given explanation. We further create simple rules to construct a set
of potentially inconsistent explanations, and query the REVERSEJUSTIFIER model for inputs that
could lead the original model to generate these adversarial explanations. When applied to the best
explanation model from Camburu et al. [4], our procedure detects an estimated 460 distinct pairs of
inconsistencies on the e-SNLI test set.
2 The e-SNLI Dataset
The natural language inference task consists in detecting whether a pair of sentences, called premise
and hypothesis, are in a relation of: entailment, if the premise entails the hypothesis; contradiction,
if the premise contradicts the hypothesis; or neutral, if neither entailment nor contradiction holds.
The SNLI corpus [3] of ∼570K such human-written instances enabled a plethora of works on this
task [28, 25, 22]. Recently, Camburu et al. [4] augmented SNLI with crowd-sourced free-form expla-
nations of the ground-truth label, called e-SNLI. Their best model for generating explanations, called
EXPLAINTHENPREDICTATTENTION (hereafter called ETPA), is a sequence-to-sequence attention
model that uses two bidirectional LSTM networks [16] for encoding the premise and hypothesis,
and an LSTM decoder for generating the explanation while separately attending over the tokens of
the premise and hypothesis. Furthermore, they predict the label solely based on the explanation via
a separately trained neural network, which maps an explanation to a label. In our work, we show
that our simple attack on the explanation generation network is able to detect a significant amount
of inconsistent explanation generated by ETPA. We highlight that our final goal is not the label
attack, even if for this particular model, since the label is predicted solely from the explanation, we
implicitly also have a label attack with high probability.2
3 Method
We define two explanations to be inconsistent if they provide logically contradictory arguments. For
example, “Seagulls are birds.” and “Seagulls and birds are different animals.” 3 are inconsistent
explanations. Our baseline method consists of the following 5 steps:
1Ideally, the explanation and predicted label align, but in general it may not be the case.
2The explanation-to-label model had a test accuracy of 96.83%.
3This is a real example of an inconsistency detected by our method.
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1. Reverse the explanation module by training a REVERSEJUSTIFIER model to map from a
generated explanation to an input that causes the model to generate this explanation.
2. For each originally generated explanation by the ETPA, generate a list of statements that
are inconsistent with the this explanation — we call them adversarial explanations.
3. Query the REVERSEJUSTIFIER model on each adversarial explanation to get what we will
call reverse inputs — i.e., inputs that may cause the model to produce adversarial explana-
tions.
4. Feed the reverse inputs into the original model to get the reverse explanations.
5. Check if any of the reverse explanations are indeed inconsistent with the original one.
In the following, we detail how we instantiate our procedure on e-SNLI.
4 Experiments
In this work, we use the trained ETPA model4 from Camburu et al. [4], which gave the highest
percentage of correct explanations (64.7%). In our experiments, for the REVERSEJUSTIFIER model,
we use the same neural network architecture and hyperparameters used by Camburu et al. [4] for
their attention model, with the difference that inputs are now premise-explanation pairs rather than
premise-hypothesis pairs, and outputs are hypotheses rather than explanations. Given a premise and
an explanation, our REVERSEJUSTIFIER model is able to reconstruct the correct hypothesis 32.78%
of the times on the e-SNLI test set. We found it satisfactory to reverse only the hypothesis; however,
it is possible to jointly reverse both premise and hypothesis, which may result in detecting more
inconsistencies due to the exploration of a larger portion of the input space.
To perform Step 2, we note that the explanations in e-SNLI naturally follow label-specific templates.
For example, annotators often used “One cannot [X] and [Y] simultaneously” to justify a contradic-
tion, “Just because [X], doesn’t mean [Y]” for neutral, or “[X] implies [Y]” for entailment. Since
two labels are mutually exclusive, transforming an explanation from one template to a template of
another label automatically creates an inconsistency. For example, for the explanation of the contra-
diction “One cannot eat and sleep simultaneously”, we match [X]=“eat” and [Y]=“sleep”, and we
create the inconsistent explanation “Eat implies sleep” using the entailment template “[X] implies
[Y]”. We note that this type of rule-based procedure is not applicable only to e-SNLI. Since explana-
tions are by nature logical sentences, for any task, one may define a set of rules that the explanations
should adhere to. For example, for explanations in self-driving cars [19], one can interchange “green
light” with “red light”, or “stop” with “accelerate”, to get inconsistent — and potentially hazardous!
— explanations such as “The car accelerates, because it is red light“. Similarly, in law applications,
one can interchange “guilty” with “innocent”, or “arrest” with “release”. Therefore, our rule-based
generation strategy— and the whole framework— can be applied to any task where one is required
to test its explanations against an essential set of predefined task-specific inconsistencies, and our
paper encourages the community to consider such hazardous inconsistencies for their tasks.
To summarize, on e-SNLI, we first created, for each label, a list of the most used templates that we
manually identified by inspecting the human annotated explanations. We provide the lists of tem-
plates in Appendix A.1. We then proceeded as follows: for each explanation generated by ETPA on
the SNLI test set, we first reversed negations (if applicable) by simply removing the “not” and “n’t”
tokens.5 Secondly, we tried to match the explanation to a template. If there was no negation and no
template match, we discarded the instance. We only discarded 2.6% of the SNLI test set in this way.
If a template was found, we identified its associated label L and retrieved the matched substrings
[X] and [Y]. For each of the templates associated with the two other labels different from L, we
substituted [X] and [Y] with the corresponding strings. We note that this procedure may result in
grammatically or semantically incorrect adversarial explanations, especially since we did not per-
form any linguistic-specific adjustments. However, our REVERSEJUSTIFIER turned out to perform
well in smoothing out these errors and in generating grammatically correct reverse hypotheses. This
is not surprising, since it has been trained to output the ground-truth correct hypothesis. Specifically,
we manually annotated 100 random instances of reversed hypotheses generated by REVERSEJUSTI-
FIER and found 81 to be both grammatically and semantically valid sentences.
4From: https://github.com/OanaMariaCamburu/e-SNLI
5During pre-processing, the tokenizer splits words such as “don’t” into two tokens: “do” and “n’t”.
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Table 1: Examples of three true detected inconsistencies (1)–(3) and one false detected inconsis-
tency (4).
(1) PREMISE: A guy in a red jacket is snowboarding in midair.
(a) ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS: A guy is outside in the snow.
PREDICTED LABEL: entailment
ORIGINAL EXPLANATION: Snowboarding is done outside.
(b) REVERSE HYPOTHESIS: The guy is outside.
PREDICTED LABEL: contradiction
REVERSE EXPLANATION: Snowboarding is not done outside.
(2) PREMISE: A man talks to two guards as he holds a drink.
(a) ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS: The prisoner is talking to two guards in the
prison cafeteria.
PREDICTED LABEL: neutral
ORIGINAL EXPLANATION: The man is not necessarily a prisoner.
(b) REVERSE HYPOTHESIS: A prisoner talks to two guards.
PREDICTED LABEL: entailment
REVERSE EXPLANATION: A man is a prisoner.
(3) PREMISE: A woman in a black outfit lies face first on a yoga mat; several paintings
are hanged on the wall, and the sun shines through a large window near her.
(a) ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS: There is a person in a room.
PREDICTED LABEL: contradiction
ORIGINAL EXPLANATION: A woman is not a person.
(b) REVERSE HYPOTHESIS: A person is on a yoga mat.
PREDICTED LABEL: entailment
REVERSE EXPLANATION: A woman is a person.
(4) PREMISE: A female acrobat with long, blond curly hair, dangling upside down
while suspending herself from long, red ribbons of fabric.
(a) ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS: A horse jumps over a fence.
PREDICTED LABEL: contradiction
ORIGINAL EXPLANATION: A female is not a horse.
(b) REVERSE HYPOTHESIS: The female has a horse.
PREDICTED LABEL: neutral
REVERSE EXPLANATION: Not all female have a horse.
For each adversarial explanation, we queried the REVERSEJUSTIFIER module and subsequently
fed each obtained reverse hypothesis back to the ETPA model to get the reverse explanation. To
check whether the reverse explanation was inconsistent with the original one, we again used the
list of adversarial explanations generated at Step 2 and checked for an exact string match. It is
likely that, at this step, we discarded a large amount of inconsistencies, due to insignificant syntactic
differences. However, when an exact match was found, i.e., a potential inconsistency, it is very
likely to be a true inconsistency. Indeed, we manually annotated a random sample of 100 pairs of
potential inconsistencies and found 85% to be true inconsistencies.
More precisely, our procedure first identified a total of 1045 pairs of potential inconsistencies for
the ETPA model applied on the test set of e-SNLI. However, multiple distinct reverse hypotheses
gave rise to the same reverse explanation. On average, we found that there are 1.93± 1.77 distinct
reverse hypotheses giving rise to the same reverse explanation. Therefore, we counted a total of
541 distinct pairs of potentially inconsistent explanations. Given our estimation of 85% to be true
inconsistencies, we obtained a total of ≈ 460 distinct true inconsistencies. While this means that
our procedure only has a success rate of 4.68%, it is nonetheless alarming that this very simple,
under-optimized framework detects a significant amount of inconsistencies on a model trained on
∼570K instances.
In Table 1, we can see three examples of true inconsistencies detected by our procedure and one
example of a false inconsistency. In Example (3), we notice that the incorrect explanation was
actually given on the original hypothesis.
Manual Scanning. Finally, we were curious to what extent a simple manual scanning would find
inconsistent explanations in the e-SNLI test set alone. We performed two such experiments. First,
we manually analyzed the first 50 instances in the test set without finding any inconsistency. How-
ever, these examples were involving different concepts, thus decreasing the likelihood of finding
inconsistencies. To account for this, in our second experiment, we constructed three groups around
the concepts of woman, prisoner, and snowboarding, by simply selecting the explanations in the test
set containing these words. We selected these concepts, because our framework detected inconsis-
tencies about them— examples are listed in Table 1.
For woman, we obtained 1150 examples, and we looked at a random sample of 20 among which we
did not find any inconsistency. For snowboarding, we found 16 examples in the test set and again
no inconsistency among them. For prisoner, we only found one instance in the test set, so we had
no ways to find out that the model is inconsistent with respect to this concept simply by scanning
the test set.
We only looked at the test set for a fair comparison with our method that was only applied on this set.
However, we highlight that manual scanning should not be regarded as a proper baseline, since it
does not bring the same benefits as our framework. Indeed, manual scanning requires considerable
human effort to look over a large set of explanations and find if any two are inconsistent.6 Moreover,
6Even a group of only 50 explanations required non-negligible time.
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restricting ourselves to the instances in the original dataset would clearly be less effective than
being able to generate new instances from the input distribution. Our framework addresses these
issues and provides direct pairs of very likely (approx. 85%) inconsistent explanations. Nonetheless,
we considered this experiment useful for illustrating that the explanation module does not provide
inconsistent explanations in a frequent manner. In fact, during our scanning over explanations, we
also experimented with a few manually created potential adversarial hypothesis from Carmona et al.
[5]. We were pleased to notice a good level of robustness against inconsistencies. For example, for
the neutral pair (premise: “A bird is above water.”, hypothesis: “A swan is above water.”), we get the
explanation “Not all birds are a swan.”, while when interchanging bird with swan (premise: “A swan
is abovewater.”, hypothesis: “A bird is abovewater.”), ETPA states that “A swan is a bird.” Similarly,
interchanging “child” with “toddler” in (premise: “A small child watches the outside world through
a window.”, hypothesis: “A small toddler watches the outside world through a window.”) does not
confuse the networks, which outputs “Not every child is a toddler.” and “A toddler is a small child.”,
respectively. Further investigation on whether the networks can be tricked on concepts where it
seems to exhibit robustness, such as toddler or swan, are left for future work.
5 Related Work
Explanatory Methods. Explaining predictions made by complex machine learning systems has
been of increasing concern [9]. These explanations can be divided into two categories: feature
importance explanations and full-sentence natural language explanations. The methods that provide
feature importance explanations [27, 23, 7, 20, 11] aim to provide the user with the subset of input
tokens that contributed the most to the prediction of the model. As pointed out by Camburu et al. [4],
these explanations are not comprehensive, as one would need to infer the missing links between the
words in order to form a complete argument. For example, in the natural language inference task,
if the explanation is formed by the words “dog” and “animal”, one would not know if the model
learned that “A dog is an animal” or “An animal is a dog” or maybe even that “Dog and animal
implies entailment”. It is also arguably more user-friendly to get a full sentence explanation rather
than a set of tokens. Therefore, an increasing amount of works focus on providing full sentence
explanations [4, 19, 14]. However, generating fluent argumentation, while more appealing, it is
also arguably a harder and more risky task. For example, similar in spirit to our work, Hendricks
et al. [15] identified the risk of mentioning attributes from a strong class prior without any evidence
being present in the input. In our work, we bring awareness to the risk of generating inconsistent
explanations.
Generating Adversarial Examples. Generating adversarial examples has received increasing at-
tention in natural language processing [31, 30]. However, most works in this space build on the
requirement that the adversarial input should be a small perturbation [1, 17] or be preserving the
main semantics [18] of the original input, but leading to a different prediction. While this is nec-
essary for testing the stability of a model, our goal does not require the adversarial input to be
semantically equivalent to the original, and any pair of correct English inputs that causes the model
to produce inconsistent explanations suffices. On the other hand, the aforementioned models do not
always require the adversarial input to be grammatically correct, and often they can change words or
characters to completely random ones [8]. This assumption is acceptable for certain use cases, such
as summarization of long pieces of text, where changing a few words would likely not change the
main flow of the text. However, in our case, the inputs are short sentences and the model is being
tested for robustness in fine-grained reasoning and common-sense knowledge, therefore it is more
desirable to test the model on grammatically correct sentences.
Most importantly, to our knowledge, no previous adversarial attack for sequence-to-sequence mod-
els produces a complete target sequence. The closest to this goal, Cheng et al. [8] requires the
presence of certain tokens anywhere in the target sequence. They only test with up to 3 required
tokens, and their success rate dramatically drops from 99% for 1 required token to 37% for 3 tokens
for the task of summarization. Similarly, Zhao et al. [33] proposed an adversarial framework for ob-
taining only the presence or absence of certain tokens in the target sequence for the task of machine
translation. Our scenario would require as many tokens as the desired adversarial explanation, and
we also additionally need them to be in a given order, thus tackling a much challenging task.
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Finally, Minervini and Riedel [24] attempted to find inputs where a model trained on SNLI violates
a set of logical constraints. This scenario may in theory lead to also finding inputs that lead to
inconsistent explanations. However, their method needs to enumerate and evaluate a potentially
very large set of perturbations of the inputs, obtained by, e.g., removing sub-trees or replacing tokens
with their synonyms. While they succeed in finding adversarial examples, finding exact inconsistent
explanations is a harder task, and hence their approach would be significantly more computationally
challenging. Additionally, their perturbations are rule-based, and hence can easily generate incorrect
English text. Moreover, their scenario does not require addressing the question of automatically
producing undesired — in our case inconsistent — sequences.
Therefore, our work introduces a new practical attack scenario, and proposes a simple yet effective
procedure, which we hope will be further improved by the community.
6 Summary and Outlook
In this work, we identified an essential shortcoming of the class of models that produce natural
language explanations for their own decisions: the fact that such models are prone to producing in-
consistent explanations, which can undermine users’ trust in the model. We introduced a framework
for identifying pairs of inconsistent explanations. We instantiated our procedure on the best explana-
tion model available in the literature on e-SNLI, and obtained a significant amount of inconsistencies
generated by this model.
The concern that we raise is general and can have a large practical impact. For example, humans
would likely not accept a self-driving car if its explanation module— for example, the one proposed
by Kim et al. [19] — is prone to state that “The car accelerates, because there is a red light at the
intersection”.
Future work will focus on two directions: developing more advanced procedures for detecting in-
consistencies, and preventing the explanation modules from generating such inconsistencies.
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A Supplemental Material
A.1 Entailment Templates
List of manually created templates for generating inconsistent explanations. “token1/token2”means
that a separate sentence has been generated for each of the tokens. [X] and [Y] are the key elements
that we want to identify and use in the other templates in order to create inconsistencies. [...] is a
placeholder for any string, and its value is not relevant.
• [X] is/are a type of [Y]
• [X] implies [Y]
• [X] is/are the same as [Y]
• [X] is a rephrasing of [Y]
• [X] is a another form of [Y]
• [X] is synonymous with [Y]
• [X] and [Y] are synonyms/synonymous
• [X] can be [Y]
• [X] and [Y] is/are the same thing
• [X] then [Y]
• [X] if [X] , then [Y]
• [X] so [Y]
• [X] must be [Y]
• [X] has to be [Y]
• [X] is/are [Y]
Neutral Templates
• not all [X] are/have [Y]
• not every [X] is/has [Y]
• just because [X] does not/n’t mean/imply [Y]
• [X] is/are not necessarily [Y]
• [X] does not/n’t have to be [Y]
• [X] does not/n’t imply/mean [Y]
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Contradiction Templates
• [...] cannot/can not/can n’t [X] and [Y] at the same time/simultaneously
• [...] cannot/can not/can n’t [X] and at the same time [Y]
• [X] is/are not (the) same as [Y]
• [...] is/are either [X] or [Y]
• [X] is/are not [Y]
• [X] is/are the opposite of [Y]
• [...] cannot/can not/can n’t [X] if [Y]
• [X] is/are different than [Y]
• [X] and [Y] are different [...]
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